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Abstract 
This paper introduces the indexing paradox, which states that it if all investors are 
rational with rational expectations and have a common risk-averse investment 
performance measure, then no investor can expect to do better than the market.  If 
the cost of indexing is less than the cost of active investing, then all investors 
would index, which would result with no mechanism to price the possible 
investments.  This paradox relies merely on understanding averages. It does not 
rely on markets being “informationally efficient,” as demonstrated in a model 







Associate Professor of Finance 
Department of Management 
College of Business and Public Administration 
Eastern Washington University 
668 N. Riverpoint Blvd., Suite A 






email: deagle@ewu.edu - 1 - 
The Indexing Paradox 
Be Thankful for Irrational Analysts 
by David Eagle, Ph.D. 
 
One of the most important decisions facing stock investors is whether to use 
active investing or index investing (also called passive investing).  According to Buffet 
(1996), "Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to 
own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following 
this path are sure to beat the net results delivered by the great majority of investment 
professionals." 
Bogle (1998) explains how the much higher costs associated with the average 
active mutual fund causes that fund's performance to be much less than a low-cost index 
fund's performance:  
 
" … the costs the fund incurs — advisory fees, operating expenses, 
marketing …, plus the cost of buying and selling portfolio securities … 
can be conservatively estimated at upwards of 2.0 percent per year. … [In] 
the past 15 years … an all-market index fund, operated at a cost of 0.2 
percent  … would have provided an annual return of 16.5 percent — or 
nearly 99 percent of the market return … [compared to]… 86 percent for 
the [average] managed fund…. In fact, the terminal value of an initial 
investment of $10,000 in the index fund would have been worth $98,800 
(97 percent of the market result), while the terminal value of the same 
investment in the traditionally managed active fund would have been 
$74,200, only 73 percent of the market."[brackets added] 
 
An additional advantage of index funds is that they pass less taxable capital gains onto 
their taxable investors because their turnover rate is so much less than active funds.
1 
                                                 
1 To be fair, one should list the disadvantages of indexing as well as the advantages.  However, while there 
are some critics of indexing, their criticisms primarily are criticisms of the S&P 500 index funds in that this 
index is for large-cap stocks and thus does not represent the whole market.  I agree with this criticism.  
However, the indexing underlying the indexing paradox must be a whole market index. - 2 - 
  Given the arguments in favor of index funds, some may wonder why anyone 
would choose to invest in an actively managed fund when they could index.  Responding 
to that thought, Friedman (1999) argued, "… if all owners of equities used index funds, 
there would be nothing to decide the prices of anything. It’s the people who don’t use 
index funds who are essentially setting the relative prices of different stocks."  This 
paper presents a different perspective about the possibility of everyone indexing.  While 
agreeing with Friedman's conclusion that the market would collapse if everyone were to 
index, this perspective also states it makes no economic sense that anyone would actively 
invest in a market consisting of all rational investors.   If this sounds contradictory, it is, 
and this is the reason we call this perspective, "The Indexing Paradox." 
  While this paper is the first to formally label and identify "The Indexing 
Paradox," pervious writers have to some extent realized the paradox existed.  Jones 
(2000) recognized this paradox but mistakenly assumed it depended on the existence of 
efficient markets.  The present paper shows that the Indexing Paradox holds even in the 
absence of efficient markets. 
  The next section presents and proves the Indexing Paradox, which consists of four 
assumptions and a conclusion.  To better understand this paradox, we then develop an 
equilibrium model of stock allocation involving utility-maximizing investors having 
comparative informational advantages.  We use the model first as an example to show 
how the Indexing Paradox unfolds.  Then we look more closely at two of the assumptions 
of the paradox to see whether those assumptions could be violated in reality, and if so, 
then how changes in those assumptions would affect the Indexing Paradox.  At the end of - 3 - 
the paper, we summarize the conclusions reached in the paper and reflect upon the real 
world implications of the Indexing Paradox. 
 
A Succinct Statement of The Indexing Paradox 
Assume (i) investors have rational expectations, (ii) investors make rational 
decisions, (iii) investors have a common risk-averse investment performance 
measure, and (iv) indexing results in a return equal to the average market return.  
Under these assumptions, no investor can expect to do better than the market.  If 
the cost of indexing is less than the cost of active investing, then all investors 
would index, which would result with no mechanism to price the possible 
investments. 
 
The Indexing Paradox  stems from the often-ignored reality that in order for some 
to do better than the average, others must do worse than the average.  This paradox 
assumes rational expectations in the sense that investors have unbiased expectations, 
which implies that the average of all the investors' expected investment performances 
equals the expected performance on the overall market. 
Under rational expectations, some investors may expect to perform better than 
market, but then other investors must expect to perform worse than the market.  
However, it would be irrational for investors to engage in active investing with submarket 
expected performances when they could index and always get the market return.  
Therefore, in equilibrium, no investor would expect to do worse than the market, which 
implies that no investor would expect to do better than the market.  In other words, no 
investor would expect to do better than indexing. 
The above paragraph does not take into account the cost differentials between 
active and passive investing.  If the cost of indexing is less than the cost of active 
investing as very clearly seems to be the case in reality, then no investor in such a world - 4 - 
of rational investors would choose to actively invest; in other words, all investors would 
index.  As the Indexing Paradox states, if all investors index, then there is no mechanism 
to price the possible investments. 
We acknowledge that universal indexing has yet to materialize.  Less than 10% of 
the equity market is under index management. Nevertheless, the Indexing Paradox still 
has implications to reality.  In particular, if not everyone indexes, we must ask ourselves 
why.  Is it because investors are irrational?  Is it because investors do not have rational 
expectations, that instead they are, on average, delusional?  Is it because investors are 
different, possessing different utilities and different levels of risk aversion, thus needing 
different performance measures?  Or is it that indexing (before costs) does not actually do 
as well as the market? 
Also, the Indexing Paradox may have relevance to the direction the market might 
head in the future.  If investor irrationality is why not all investors index, education of the 
benefits of indexing, education about decision-making errors and bias, and more 
computerization to supplement or supplant human decisions may eventually lead to an 
increasing share of the market switching to indexing, which could bring us closer to the 
market demise that the Indexing Paradox predicts. 
Discovering a new paradox is one thing; understanding it is another.  The rest of 
this paper explores the Indexing Paradox in the context of an equilibrium model of 
expected utility maximizing investors possessing different degrees of comparative 
informational advantages and disadvantages. 
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Basic Description of the Model 
  This one-year model consists of a positive number of expected-utility-maximizing 
investors (m) and a positive number of stocks (n), where the value of the stock one year 
from now (which is the stock's termination value) depends on a particular probability 
distribution.  For simplicity, this model uses a common distribution for each stock.   
Investors do, however, have different comparative informational advantages and different 
information sets and thus generally have differing expectations.  So that investors have 
the same performance measure, we assume that the investors have identical risk-averse 
utility functions of return. Each investor attempts to maximize the investor's expected 
utility given the investor's information set by choosing whether to actively invest or to  
index and, if the investor chooses to actively invest, then choosing what fraction of the 
investor's initial wealth to invest in each stock. 
  Fixed quantities of stock exist.  A full equilibrium exists when (1) each investor 
maximizes his/her expected utility given his/her information set and (2) the resulting 
demand for each stock equals this fixed supply of each stock.  The computation of this 
full equilibrium is very complex because investors know the equilibrium prices of the 
stocks, but those equilibrium prices themselves depend on the stock demands of the 
investors and hence at least partially reflect some information (See Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980).  Instead of directly computing the full equilibrium, we instead present a 
sequence of quasi equilibria that lead to a full equilibrium.  A quasi equilibrium differs 
from a full equilibrium in that investors do not take into account the informational 
content of prices when they maximize their expected utility. This sequence of quasi 
equilibria also tells a story about how the Indexing Paradox would unfold. - 6 - 
  The indexing methodology we use is where an indexing investor owns an equal 









 amount of money into stock i where pi is the price of stock i, si is the supply 
of stock i, and wj is the wealth of investor j. This implied index is a weighted average 
index of all stocks in the stock market.
2 
  Because of the complexities of the model, we are unable to find a closed-form 
algebraic solution of the model.  Instead, we use a combination of Monte Carlo 
simulations and computer numerical analysis.  Even with the computerization, the task of 
maximizing expected utility for each investor is too time consuming for our computers.  
Instead, we maximize a proxy utility function of expected portfolio return and standard 
deviation that seems to generate results sufficiently consistent with maximization of 
expected utility. 
The Monte Carlo simulation generates values for the random variables of the 
model. For these random variables the computer iterates through the following process: 
1.  Using numerical methods, the simulation determines for each investor the 
fractions of funds that the investor invests in each stock in order to maximize 
the investor's proxy utility function of expected portfolio return and standard 
deviation conditional on the information the investor has with the exception 
that the investor ignores any informational content in prices. 
                                                 
2 This indexing methodology and indeed the Indexing Paradox can be extended to any market of risky 
assets as long as we know the prices and existing quantity of those assets.  However, for readability this 
paper will refer to these assets as stocks. - 7 - 
2.  The computer determines the excess demand or supply for each stock and then 
increases or decreases the prices to move toward equilibrium.   
Eventually the computer reaches a quasi equilibrium.  The computer then repeats 
this process by generating a new set of values for the random variables and redetermining 
the quasi equilibrium for those random variables.  For each simulation in this paper, the 
computer conducted 70 sets of these random variable realizations to create a very good 
"sample" of the possibilities.  We then compare how each investor did relative to the 
performance of indexers.  When the Monte Carol results show an active investor expects 
to do worse than the indexers, we switch that investor to being an indexer and then repeat 
the process all over again. 
While we do use a proxy utility function to determine the investors’ "optimal" 
choices, we use the actual utility function to compute the average of the utilities across all 
simulated realizations to get what we call "the after-simulation expected utility" for each 
investor. Given the theoretical nature of this model and our assumption that investors 
have the same utility function, we use the after-simulation expected utility as the common 
performance measure. 
  The next section discusses the mathematical details of the model.  Readers should 
be able to skip that section if they choose and still be able to get a general understanding 
of the rest of the paper. 
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Mathematical Details of Model 
  This one-year
3 model assumes there are m investors and n stocks.  The investors 
invest their money at time 0 and spend their money at time 1.  Stock i's value at the end 
of the period is 
i i i i i k u k v h ) 1 ( - + =                 (1) 
where vi is the value of stock i at time 1, and ui, and hi are independent random variables, 
each with a standard exponential distribution.  Both ui, and hi represent unsystematic risk.  
(For simplicity, this model does not include any systematic risk.)  However, ui is 
somewhat predictable depending on ones comparative informational advantage, while hi 
is completely unpredictable for all investors.  Equation (1) states that the value of stock i 
at the end of the period depends on the weighted average of ui, and hi.  For the 
simulations in this paper, ki equals one half, where vi is equally determined by ui, and hi. 
  Each investor j has his or her own comparative informational advantage at 
predicting the value of stock i.  Investor j's comparative informational advantage is 
represented by gij, which can range between 0 and 1.  Each investor j observes a related 
random variable yij that gives some information on ui depending on the value of gij.  The 
observed random variable is given by: 
  ij ij i ij ij g u g y e ) 1 ( - + =               (2) 
where eij is a random variable that has a standard exponential distribution and is 
independent from ui and hi,.  As stated before, gij represents investor j's comparative 
                                                 
3 Many modelers talk about this type of model as being a two-period model.  We prefer to think of it as a 
one-period model with a beginning and an end.   Investors invest at the beginning of the period and 
consume at the end of the period. - 9 - 
informational advantage at predicting the value of stock i.  If gij equals 0, then yij provides 
no predictive information about ui.  If gij equals 1, then yij can perfectly predict ui. 
  Below are four cases depending on the value of gij and the conditional expected 
value of ui and its conditional variance under those cases: 
Case 1: gij = 0.  Ej[ui | yij] = 1 and varj[ui | yij] = 1 as yij provides no information on ui.  
Therefore, Ej[ui | yij] and varj[ui | yij] equal the unconditional expected 
value and unconditional variance of ui, both of which equal 1 since ui 
has a standard exponential distribution. 
Case 2: gij = 1.  Ej[ui | yij] = yij and varj[ui | yij] = 0.  By equation (2), yij = ui which means 
yij provides complete information on ui.  
Appendix A derives the results given below for cases 3 and 4: 
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  Next, we need to determine each investor's expected value and variance of each 
future stock value conditional on their information about yij.  Returning to equation (1), 
since ui and hi are independent, and hi has a standard exponential distribution, - 10 - 
) 1 ( ] | [ ] | [ i ij i j i ij i j k y u E k y v E - + =             (5) 
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r where pi is the price of stock i at 
the beginning of the period.  Therefore, the expected return on stock i and the variance of 
that return conditional on  ij y  are: 
1
] | [
] | [ - =
i
ij i j
ij i j p
y v E
y r E               (7) 
  2
] | [ var
] | [ var
i
ij i j
ij i j p
y v
y r =               (8) 
  These expectations and variances for investor j are conditional only on yij for 
i=1..n and not prices.  However, the prices will at least partially reflect the information 
observed by all investors.  Ignoring this informational content of prices could lead to 
significant expectational errors.  However, we will find that the sequence of quasi 
equilibria that results from low performing active investors switching to indexing does 
lead to a full equilibrium where investors do not make those expectational errors. 
  We assume that investors have identical utility functions and that their desire is to 
maximize their expected utility.  Each investor j's utility function is U(
P
j r ) = ln(1+
P
j r ) 
where ln(.) is the natural logarithm and 
P
j r  is the return on investor j's portfolio.  Given 
that this is a utility function only of return and not wealth, relative risk aversion should be 
constant; the logarithmic utility function does have a constant relative risk coefficient of 
one. - 11 - 
Equilibrium is defined when the following conditions hold: 
1.  Each investor j maximizes his/her expected utility conditional on his/her 
information on yij and pi for stocks i=1..n by (a) choosing whether to analyze 
or index, and (b) if an analyst, choosing the fraction of funds to invest in each 
individual stock. 
2.  All stock markets clear. 
A quasi equilibrium is defined when the investors who engage in active investing 
and who index are given and the following conditions hold: 
1.  Each active investor j maximizes his/her expected utility conditional on 
his/her information on yij for stocks i=1..n. 
2.  All stock markets clear. 
The differences between a full equilibrium and a quasi equilibrium are two: First, 
for a quasi equilibrium, whether an investor actively invests or indexes is given; for a full 
equilibrium, the investor determines whether to engage in active investing or indexing 
based on expected utility maximization.  Second, for a quasi equilibrium, the investor 
ignores the informational content of the individual stock prices; for a full equilibrium, the 
investor does take that information into account. 
  A closed-form solution of the quasi equilibrium of this paper is not possible.  
Instead we conduct Monte-Carlo simulations, and use computer numerical methods to 
both solve the investor's maximization problem and to determine the prices where 
demand equals supply for each stock.  To simplify our analysis, we use a proxy for 
maximizing each individual i's expected utility.    This proxy, a utility function of the 
expected value and standard deviation of the portfolio return, is a straight average of the - 12 - 








j s ) where c is a constant, 
P
j r  is 
the return on the portfolio for individual j, 
P
j s  is the standard deviation of the portfolio 
for individual j, and U(.) is the investor's utility function.  Currently we are using c=2, 
which seems to give results sufficiently consistent with true expected utility 
maximization. 
 
Analysis and Results 
For a simulation of ten investors and ten 
stocks, Table 1 presents the expected returns, 
standard deviations, and utilities for each investor 
depending on how many of the investors are indexers.   Investors are ordered from lowest 
to highest by their comparative informational advantage (Investor j's comparative 
informational advantage variable, gij, equals (j-1)/(m-1) for all stocks i and for all 
investors j, where m is 10, the number of investors).  Table 1 depicts a story where 
investors with lower comparative informational advantages switch to indexing when they 
realize they are expecting to do worse than the market and hence worse than indexing. 
When all investors are actively investing, the after-simulation expected portfolio 
returns for investors 1, 2, 3, and 4 are negative.  These investors’ before-simulation 
expected returns were positive.  This before-simulation/after-simulation discrepancy in 
expected returns results from investors, in a quasi equilibrium, making expectational 
errors because they ignore the information reflected in prices. 
Once investors realize that they will make those expectational errors, they take 
corrective action.  One way they can take corrective action is to switch to indexing.  To 
Figure 1:List of Parameter Values for 
               Basic Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
n=10 (# of stocks) 
m=10 (# of investors) 
wj=1 for each investor j (wealth) 
si=1.1 for each stock i (supply of stock) 
ki=0.5 (portion of stock value related to 
information variables) 
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determine if these investors would be better off actively investing or indexing, it is best to 
look at the after-simulation expected utility of each investor, which accounts for both 
expected return and risk.  When all investors are analysts, investors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 
have lower expected utilities than the 6.04 centi-utils
4 they would have experienced had 
they indexed. As a result, those six investors switch to indexing. 
Table 1: Simulation Results With No Margin Trading 
 Expected Returns and (Standard Deviations)    Expected Utility (centi-utils) 
   number of indexers      number of indexers   
investor  0  6  8  9    0  6  8  9 
  (27.8%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
2  -2.76%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    -7.15  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (28.0%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
3  -0.61%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    -4.64  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (28.1%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
4  -0.80%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    -5.5  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (29.8%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
5  2.39%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    -1.98  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (28.4%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
6  11.20%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    5.63  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (34.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
7  13.80%  4.97%  9.20%  9.19%    8.49  0.16  6.06  6.05 
  (34.4%)  (32.2%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
8  19.40%  6.41%  9.20%  9.19%    13.88  2.75  6.06  6.05 
  (32.2%)  (26.9%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
9  25.60%  12.30%  8.66%  9.19%    19.61  8.78  5.35  6.05 
  (30.7%)  (25.7%)  (25.4%)  (24.6%)           
                   
10  26.30%  13.10%  9.73%  9.18%    20.5  9.76  6.60  6.05 
  (30.6%)  (25.0%)  (24.7%)  (24.6%)           
                  
Indexers  9.18%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    6.04  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
Note: Shaded area represents indexers. 
A centi-util is one one-hundredth of a util. 
 
 
When all investors are analysts, investors 7, 8, 9, and 10 expect to do better than 
the market.  However, when the other investors switch to indexing, investors 7 and 8 find 
                                                 
4 A centi-util is defined as 1/100
th of util. - 14 - 
their expected utilities being below the market average of 6.05 centi-utils, which is the 
expected utility of an indexer.  The reason is that the active investors as a whole can only 
do as well as the market average, and, if investors 9 and 10 do better than the market 
average, then others must expect to do worse than the market average. 
Because they expect to do worse than the market if they remain analysts, investors 
7 and 8 switch to indexing.  While investor 9 expected to do better than the market before 
investors 7 and 8 became indexers, when all but investors 9 and 10 index, investor 9 has 
an expected utility less than the market average of 6.06 centi-utils.  Therefore, investor 9 
also switches to indexing.  However, when only investor 10 remains as an active investor, 
his/her expected portfolio return, standard deviation of return, and expected utility are 
then the same as the market average. 
The quasi equilibrium where only investor 10 is actively investing is also a full 
equilibrium.  Since the model does not assume any cost of active investing (or of 
indexing), investor 10 is indifferent between active investing and indexing.  As a result, 
investor 10 is maximizing his or her expected utility in this quasi equilibrium.  Also, 
since the only information that can be reflected in prices is the information investor 10 
directly observes, investor 10 is already fully using this information.  The other investors 
in the market must also be fully using the information reflected in prices, because 
obviously they cannot use that information to do better than investor 10 who directly 
observes that information and they are already doing as well as investor 10 by indexing.
5 
                                                 
5 That stock prices could only partially reflect information and not fully reflect that information was shown 
in a model by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  The randomness in that model that caused the less-than-full 
reflection of information stemmed from randomness Grossman and Stiglitz assumed in the supply of the 
risky asset.  However, the supply (the number of shares outstanding) of stock is public information in 
reality and that public information is the basis for indexing.  Nevertheless, using random components on 
the demand side rather than the supply side can salvage the Grossman and Stiglitz’s results.  That is the 
approach taken in this paper.  We make no assumptions about the investors’ knowledge of other investors’ - 15 - 
Table 2: Simulation Results With Margin Trading 
 Expected Returns and (Standard Deviations)    Expected Utility (centi-utils) 
   number of indexers      number of indexers   
investor  0  6  8  9    0  6  8  9 
  (40.9%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
2  -20.80%  9.18%  9.19%  9.20%    -INF  6.04  6.05  6.06 
  (38.7%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
3  -13.40%  9.18%  9.19%  9.20%    -INF  6.04  6.05  6.06 
  (39.5%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
4  -11.80%  9.18%  9.19%  9.20%    -33.05  6.04  6.05  6.06 
  (39.4%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
5  -4.60%  9.18%  9.19%  9.20%    -12.64  6.04  6.05  6.06 
  (33.5%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
6  10.00%  9.18%  9.19%  9.20%    -INF  6.04  6.05  6.06 
  (42.1%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
7  16.60%  1.10%  9.19%  9.20%    6.76  -5.82  6.05  6.06 
  (50.6%)  (37.1%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
8  35.40%  6.90%  9.19%  9.20%    23.48  2.84  6.05  6.06 
  (49.1%)  (27.8%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
                   
9  50.40%  14.20%  8.63%  9.20%    34.73  10.4  5.32  6.06 
  (52.2%)  (26.4%)  (25.4%)  (24.6%)           
                   
10  51.70%  14.60%  9.74%  9.19%    35.85  10.99  6.60  6.05 
  (52.0%)  (25.6%)  (24.7%)  (24.6%)           
                  
Indexers  9.18%  9.20%  9.20%  9.19%    6.04  6.05  6.06  6.05 
  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)  (24.6%)           
 
 
Note: Shaded area represents indexers. 
 
In the simulations in table 1, we did not allow any margin trading because we 
restricted the fraction of funds invested in one stock to range between 0 and 1.  To show 
that selling short and buying on the margin does not affect the indexing paradox, we ran 
new simulations where investors' fraction of funds in one stock could range between -1 
and 2.  This very generous margin trading allowance allowed investors to sell short the 
value of a particular stock equal to the amount of the investor's wealth.  It also allowed 
                                                                                                                                                 
wealth or their utility functions.  If individual investors are uncertain of this knowledge, then prices would 
only partially refect information. - 16 - 
investors to buy on the margin equal to twice that of the investor's wealth.  No other 
restrictions were made other than the sum of the fractions of funds in each stock still 
needed to add up to one for each investor. 
The results of this simulation with margin trading are shown in Table 2.  The 
results are similar to the results without margin trading, except that often investor 
expectational errors due to ignoring the informational content of prices caused the 
investors to have expected utilities of negative infinity.  Because the complexity of 
margin trading does not seem to affect the validity of the indexing paradox, the rest of the 
paper assumes no margin trading. 
  Now that we have seen the unfolding of the Indexing Paradox with this paper's 
model, we can investigate how changes in the assumptions of the Indexing Paradox can 
affect whether the Indexing Paradox still holds.  The first two assumptions of the 
Indexing Paradox involve rationality, which the summary and conclusions section of this 
paper discusses. 
  The third assumption of the Indexing Paradox is that investors all have the same 
performance measure.  Our model met this assumption by investors having identical 
utility functions; hence we used expected utility as the uniform measure of performance.  
We now revise the model to allow for two different utility functions depending on 
whether the investor's identifying number is odd or even. Even investors continue to have 
the logarithmic utility function, which has a coefficient of relative risk aversion of one.  
Odd investors, on the other hand, now have the utility function, U(r) =  ( ) 1 1 2 - + r , 
which has a coefficient of relative risk aversion of one-half. - 17 - 
Table 3: Simulation Results  With Different Utility Functions 
 Expected Returns and (Standard Deviations)    Expected Utility (in centi-utils) 
   number of indexers      number of indexers   
investor  0  6  8  9    0  6  8  9   
  (31.08%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
2  -2.62%  9.17%  9.19%  9.19%    -6.78  6.03  6.05  6.05   
  (27.37%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
3  -5.31%  9.17%  9.19%  9.19%    -8.02  7.57  7.60  7.59   
  (31.43%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
4  -1.03%  9.17%  9.19%  9.19%    -5.62  6.03  6.05  6.05   
  (29.21%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
5  3.10%  9.17%  9.19%  9.19%    0.27  7.57  7.60  7.59   
  (33.38%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
6  10.65%  9.17%  9.19%  9.19%    4.88  6.03  6.05  6.05   
  (35.59%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
7  18.89%  4.39%  9.19%  9.19%    15.58  1.80  7.60  7.59   
  (36.78%)  (33.68%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
8  18.39%  5.30%  9.19%  9.19%    12.76  1.32  6.05  6.05   
  (32.85%)  (27.89%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)             
                     
9  27.36%  14.18%  9.40%  9.17%    23.97  12.29  7.73  7.58   
  (31.66%)  (26.03%)  (25.23%)  (24.59%)             
                     
10  26.41%  12.79%  8.98%  9.19%    20.43  9.51  5.97  6.05   
  (30.27%)  (24.65%)  (24.09%)  (24.59%)             
                     
Indexers  9.10%  9.17%  9.19%  9.19%    7.51  7.57  7.60  7.59  odd 
  (24.55%)  (24.60%)  (24.58%)  (24.59%)    5.97  6.03  6.05  6.05  even 
Note: Shaded area represents indexers. 
 
  For this next simulation, we assign each investor's comparative informational 
advantage parameter, gij, to be (j-1) div 2 divided by 4.  ("div" represents the integer 
divide operation.)  This results with the comparative informational advantage parameters 
being 0 for investors 1 and 2, 0.25 for investors 3 and 4, 0.50 for investors 5 and 6, 0.75 
for investors 7 and 8, and 1.0 for investors 9 and 10. 
The results of the simulation with these different utility functions are shown in 
Table 3.  When all investors actively invest, investors 1, 3, and 5 have lower expected 
utilities than the 7.62 centi-utils they would have experienced had they indexed, and 
investors 2, 4, and 6 have lower expected utilities than the 6.05 centi-utils they would - 18 - 
have experienced had they indexed.  As a result, investors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 switch to 
indexing. 
When only four investors are actively investing, investors 7 and 8  have lower 
expected utility than the 7.59 and 6.02 centi-utils that they would have respectively 
experienced had they indexed.   Therefore investors 7 and 8 switch to indexing.  When 
only investors 9 and 10 index, investor 10 has a lower expected utility than if he/she had 
indexed.  Therefore, investor 10, who is more risk-averse relative to investor 9, switches 
to indexing.  Therefore, the conclusion of the Indexing Paradox holds in this example 
even though investors have different utility functions, which would cause them to have 
different measures of portfolio performance. 
  The fourth and final assumption of the Indexing Paradox is that indexing results 
with the market average return.  We have found no reason to doubt this assumption for 
the indexing method used in this paper.  Some may think that the rebalancing needs of an 
index funds could provide active investors with an opportunity to profit at the expense of 
the indexers.   They may think that when active investors learn new information, these 
active investors can react to that information before indexing changes the weights the 
index fund uses for each stock."  However, while index funds do need to adjust the 
fraction of funds they invest in each stock when prices change, they do not need to 















ij f is the 
fraction of funds invested in stock i by the jth index investor (assuming that investor j is 
an indexer). Define  ij l to be the fraction of stock i that index investor j owns, which - 19 - 
should equal the ratio of 
I
ij d , the demand for stock i by index investor j, divided by the 
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This shows that  ij l is the same for all stocks i.  In other words, index investor j owns an 
equal fraction of each stock.  As a result we will drop the i subscript.  The resulting 
j l represents investor j’s “slice” of the market for each stock. 
  Now suppose the prices change after  j l is set.  Index investor j's new wealth will 
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We conclude that index investor j’s “slice” of each stock does not vary with prices.  
Therefore, index investor j need not rebalance as a result of price changes. 
A second argument why indexing could do worse than the market average is that 
the market in reality uses market makers instead of a Walrasian auctioneer.  Therefore, 
when they learn new information, some investors can react to that information before the 
market can change to a new equilibrium.  This is part of the reason for the bid-ask spread - 20 - 
of market makers – to buffer the market maker from investors responding to new 
information before the market maker learns this information. 
This paper’s model can be used to investigate this argument by changing the 
tolerance in the numerical technique of determining equilibrium.  With the numerical 
technique used, when the absolute difference between demand and supply for a specific 
stock is less than the allowed tolerance, the computer calls the result a quasi equilibrium.  
The resulting difference between demand and supply could be interpreted as being filled 
from the inventories of the market makers.  The graph in Figure 2 shows how the 
difference in utility between the last active investor and the indexers varies with the 
equilibrium tolerance.  For small equilibrium tolerances, the performance of the active 
investors usually but not always exceeds the performance of the indexers.  However, for 
larger equilibrium tolerances, the active investors do outperform the indexers and the 
greater is the equilibrium tolerance, the greater is the degree to which active investors 
outperform the indexers. 
However, in this paper’s model, we have no one absorbing the cost of the 
equilibrium tolerance.  When active investors react to information before the market 
Figure 2: Comparison of Utilities between Last Active 
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equilibrium tolerance (% of supply)- 21 - 
makers respond, and when that information allows active investors to benefit relative to 
the market, the market markets are hurt.  The market makers will pass on those costs 
through higher bid-ask spreads.  All investors who buy or sell shares of stock will pay 
these costs.  Since active investors are buying and selling much more frequently than do 
the indexers, the vast majority of these costs will be absorbed by the active investors 
rather than by the indexers.  Therefore, this second argument is unlikely to cause the 
return for indexers to differ from the market return. 
  
Summary, Conclusions, and Reflections 
  The Indexing Paradox states that if four assumptions hold, no active investor can 
do better than indexers.  We explored the Indexing Paradox with a model where we saw 
investors, who were expecting to do worse than indexing, switching to indexing until 
only one active investor was left, which was our full equilibrium.  However, this “full” 
equilibrium was a precarious equilibrium.  The model had no cost of active investing and 
no cost of indexing.  If we were to add those costs, with the cost of active investing 
exceeding the cost of indexing, then even that last active investor will switch to indexing, 
resulting with a collapse of the market as no one will be left to set prices of the individual 
stocks.
6 
  Since the conclusion of the Indexing Paradox rests on its assumptions, we then 
investigated whether those assumptions necessarily hold and if they may not hold, then 
how would the conclusion of the index paradox change when the assumption changed.  
                                                 
6 In our model, we assume investors are pricetakers even with only one investor actively investing.  Clearly 
as the number of investors shrink, the assumption of competitive behavior becomes less justifiable.  
However, while our model does not consider noncompetitive behavior, the Indexing Paradox itself does not 
assume competitive markets. - 22 - 
We contemplated possible violations to the fourth assumption, that the return on indexing 
must equal the market return, and found no grounds to doubt this assumption. 
  We looked at the third assumption of one performance measure and considered 
two performance measures (utility functions) for two different groups having different 
levels of relative risk aversion.  In our simulations, the Indexing Paradox survived our 
relaxing this assumption. 
  We, however, know that active investors are currently very plentiful in the real 
world.  (See Rubinstein, 2000).  Therefore, at least one of the four assumptions of the 
Indexing paradox must be violated.  If the return on indexing must equal the market 
return (assumption 4) and if violating assumption 3 on one performance measure does not 
affect the conclusion of the indexing paradox, then one of the first two assumptions on 
rationality must be violated.  Therefore, because some investors do actively invest, 
some investors must be irrational.  Either some investors have irrational expectations 
or some make irrational decisions. 
  Most likely the assumption of irrational expectations is violated in reality.  In 
order for investors to remain active investors, they must all expect to do better than the 
market.  However, by basic principles of averages, only half of them will do better than 
the market average.  Therefore, half of these active investors must be delusional, 
expecting to do better than the market when in fact they probably will do worse.  If all 
investors realize that half of the investors are delusional, then how could an active 
investor, who expects to do better than the market, be sure that they are part of the 
rational half of active investors and not part of the delusional half? - 23 - 
From the behavioral side of finance and from recent psychological research, 
evidence has accumulated that people (including investors) make irrational decisions and 
have biased expectations.  Perhaps, some active investors or money managers may expect 
that they have a comparative informational advantage because of being trained not to 
make these errors. On the other hand, maybe they are just using this behaviorial side of 
finance as a rationalization for their remaining an active investor when in fact they may 
be of the half who are delusional in thinking that they expect to do better than the market. 
In one sense this paper can be looked on favorably by the finance behaviorialists 
in that it does point out that the very existence of our stock market depends on the 
existence of some investors being irrational or having irrational expectations.  However, 
even behaviorialists themselves cannot escape the Indexing Paradox.  Imagine that the 
behaviorialists are right that investors do make these irrational decisions and have 
irrational expectations.  Imagine also, that, thanks to the behaviorialists, investors 
sometime in the future are educated not to make those errors or biases or that “rational” 
computers are used to augment or supplant human decision making to correct for those 
errors or biases.  Also suppose investors are educated about indexing.  Once rationality is 
brought to the stock market, the Indexing Paradox may appear with the market demise 
that it predicts. 
While the Indexing Paradox predicts a market collapse when all investors index, 
as long as some investors are active (albeit for irrational reasons) the rest of the market is 
not significantly affected.  Tables 1, 2, and 3 show that, as long as at least one investor 
remains active, the expected utility of indexers changes only slightly and in no clear 
direction when the active investors switch to indexing. - 24 - 
Both rational active investors and indexers should be thankful for the existence of 
irrational active investors in the market.  The indexers benefit because without those 
irrational active investors, there would be no market.  The rational active investors 
benefit because the irrational active investors allow the rational active investors to beat 
the market.  However, the indexers have the comfort of knowing that they are not among 
the irrational active investors.  Most active investors will never know with certainty that 
they are among the rational half of the active investors rather than among the irrational 
half. 
 - 25 - 
Appendix 
Derivation of Expectations and Variance Terms 
 
  This appendix derives the formulas for Ej[uij|yij] and varj[uij|yij] for cases 3 and 4. 
 
Case 3: gij=½: 
  In all cases, the probability density function of ui and eij is 
ij i u
ij i e u f
e e
- - = ) , ( for 
ui³0 and eij³0 as ui and eij are independent standard exponential random variables; this 
probability density function equals 0 whenever ui or eij is less than zero.  In case 3 with 







= .  Therefore, the cumulative probability 
distribution function of ui and eij is 
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, the probability 
density function of ui and yij is 
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- = .  By integrating out ui, we get the 
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In other words, the conditional probability density function of ui given yij is uniformly 
distributed between 0 and 2yij.  Therefore, the conditional expectation and conditional 
variance of ui are: 
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Case 4: gij Î (0, ½) È (½,1): 
  The derivation of the conditional expectations and the conditional variance 
follows the same logic as in case 3, but the resulting equations are much more complex.  
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The cumulative probability distribution of ui amd  ij y ~ is 
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For ui outside this range the probability density function equals 0. 
By integrating out ui, we get the probability density function of  ij y ~ by itself: 
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  The conditional probability density function of ui given yij is 
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For values of ui outside this range, f(ui|yij)=0. 
  Using this conditional probability density function, we can determine the 
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This is equation (3). 
  Also, using the conditional probability density function, we can determine the 
conditional expectations of 
2
i u  given  ij y ~  and then we can determine the conditional 
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The conditional variance above is equation (4). - 27 - 
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